An Abstract Argumentation Framework for Handling Dynamics

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Abstract

This article introduces the notion of dynamics into the concept of abstract argumentation frameworks, by including the concept of evidence to rule the validity of arguments when considering a particular situation. The proposed formalism is a refinement of Dung’s abstract argumentation framework, to which many extensions have been defined. Our claim is that this idea could be enriched by the dynamic theory we are proposing. The main subject of this paper is the definition of the Dynamic Argumentation Framework, from which a static instance can be obtained. This instance is shown to be equivalent to the widely adopted Dung’s framework. Therefore, multiple frameworks can be obtained from different instances of a given dynamic framework.

Introduction and Background

In this article we present a new abstract argumentation framework capable of dealing with dynamics through the consideration of a varying set of evidence. Certain configurations of the set of evidence will determine an instance of the framework in which some arguments hold and others do not. The extended formalization, which is coherent with the original abstractions, will provide the opportunity to tackle new problems and applications.

Frameworks for abstract argumentation have gained wide acceptance, and are the basis for the implementation of concrete formalisms (Dung 1995). The original proposal by Dung defines an abstract framework and several notions of acceptability of arguments. Since then, many extensions were introduced to enrich this approach, not only by defining new semantics (i.e., different ways of accepting arguments) (Baroni and Giacomin 2007), but also by adding properties to the framework (Amgoud, Cayrol, and Lagasquie-Schiex 2004; Wyner and Bench-Capon 2007; Martínez, García, and Simari 2007) thus broadening the field of application of the original contribution—a survey about the applications of argumentation can be found in (Bench-Capon and Dunne 2007). Part of the argumentation community is moving in this direction, thus evolving the notion of abstract argumentation framework, which have proven to be suitable to model dialogues, negotiation processes and decision making mechanisms. The combination of argumentation and other disciplines is also under study, like belief revision (Rotstein et al. 2008). The spread of argumentation into the knowledge representation area is very promising, and this article aims to keep up with it by exploring a new line that could contribute to the expansion of the existing subareas. That is, the objective of this article is two-fold: it provides an extension of the existing theory and it also can be used as a base to enrich current abstract models.

In this article, we extend the classic theory of abstract argumentation (Chesñevar, Maguitman, and Loui 2000; Prakken and Vreeswijk 2000) to cope with the dynamics of evidence. The framework defined here is a refinement of Dung’s, attempting to take a step forward into a not-so-abstract form of argumentation. In the literature, an argument is treated as an indivisible entity that suffices to support a claim, whereas here arguments are also indivisible, but they play a smaller role: they are aggregated in structures. These argumental structures can be thought as if they were arguments (in the usual sense), but they do not always guarantee their actual achievement of the claim. Moreover, in the literature arguments are often considered as completely abstract entities, with no regard about their composition. Here, we not only use arguments to generate structures, but we also explicitly mention a set of premises and a claim within both arguments and structures. The consideration of these features, i.e., premises, inference and claims, has been part of the literature on logic, argumentation, and critical thinking from the early stages of the area (see (Toulmin 1959; Walton 1996) and more recently in (Chesñevar et al. 2006)).

The association of a set of premises to each argument leads us to the consideration of the role of evidence. We rely on the available evidence in order to determine whether arguments actually support their claim; this notion will be translated in terms of argumental structures later on. The study of the variation of the set of evidence and its impact on the status of arguments (i.e., whether they can be used to make inferences) is one of the main contributions of this article, since it is the foundation of the dynamic framework. The other important contribution is the equivalence between Dung’s framework and what we call a static instance of the DAF. We try to move forward in this direction, provided that “static” argumentation frameworks have been analyzed quite deeply in the last few years, since Dung’s seminal work. Although the dynamic framework here proposed is enriched...
with a number of features, we establish a relation that keeps us close to the results accomplished in the area.

The article is organized in the following way: the next section provides the theoretical elements (some of them adapted from their standard form) in order to define the dynamic framework; the second section gathers the theory previously defined and formalizes the new framework; afterwards, there is a section devoted to ongoing work regarding this research line; finally, the last section summarizes the results achieved in this paper and describes further extensions to the dynamic framework.

### Preliminary Definitions

In this section we give the preliminary definitions from which the dynamic framework can be built. First, we define what an argument is, its relation with the set of evidence, and expected behavior. Then, we organize arguments in argumental structures, which provide arguments with a context when speaking of activeness (the actual availability of arguments to perform reasoning).

#### Argument

Arguments are pieces of reasoning that provide backing for a claim from a set of premises. These basic premises are considered as the argument’s support. In the argumentation frameworks theory it is usually assumed that these premises (thus, the arguments they belong to) always hold, since frameworks show a snapshot of what is happening. However, as we are defining a dynamic system, it is natural to consider that some premises could be not satisfied. That is, we should account for what is not happening. Therefore, we must distinguish between what we call active and inactive arguments. In this article, arguments deemed as active will be those capable of actually achieving their claim. This will depend on whether the argument’s premises are satisfied, i.e., available either as evidence or claims of other active arguments. On this matter, a piece of evidence could be considered as a claim supported by an empty argument, or it could be treated separately, as a unique entity. In this article, we choose the latter option. Although we believe that the notion of evidence could be related to that of a claim, we also believe it represents a different concept. We could also consider a piece of evidence as a claim that needs no argument; evidence is there, beyond discussion. In contrast to the concept of active argument we introduce the definition of inactive argument as an argument that, in concordance with the current situation, is incapable of achieving its claim.

Given an argument \( A \), we will identify both its claim and support through the functions \( \text{cl}(A) \) and \( \text{supp}(A) \), respectively. In the same way, given a set \( \text{Args} \) of arguments, we assume a function returning the set of all the claims in \( \text{Args} \): \( \text{clset}(\text{Args}) = \{ \text{cl}(A) \mid A \in \text{Args} \} \), and a function returning the set of all the premises in \( \text{Args} \): \( \text{suppset}(\text{Args}) = \bigcup_{A \in \text{Args}} \text{supp}(A) \). Finally, since arguments are representing reasoning steps, we assume them as being minimal and self-consistent: no premise is the claim itself\(^1\), and the combination of claim plus premises is contradictory (see Definition 3). In this article, we say that two sentences are contradictory or inconsistent if they cannot be assumed together.

**Definition 1 (Set of Evidence)** A set of evidence is a consistent set of facts representing the current state of the world.

Evidence is considered an indivisible and self-conclusive piece of knowledge that could come from perception, communication, or might be just agent’s own knowledge (e.g., its role). As stated before, evidence “triggers” some arguments, which we will call active. It is important to say that, throughout this article, when we refer to a set of evidence, we assume that it is consistent.

**Definition 2 (Argument Support)** Given an argument \( A \) the argument support for \( A \) is a set of premises \( \text{supp}(A) = \{s_1, \ldots, s_n\} \), where each premise \( s_i \) can be either evidence or a claim of another argument.

In what follows, arguments will be noted as a pair, where its first element is the argument’s set of premises, and the second one, its claim. For instance, if \( \text{supp}(A) = \{a, b\} \) and \( \text{cl}(A) = y \), we will note this argument as \( A = \{a, b\}, y \). Once the support and claim of an argument are clear (or when they are irrelevant), arguments will be called just by their name.

**Definition 3 (Argument)** An argument \( A \) is a pair \( \langle \{s_1, \ldots, s_n\}, \alpha \rangle \), verifying:

- \( \{s_1, \ldots, s_n, \alpha\} \) is consistent;
- there is no \( s_i \in \text{supp}(A) \) such that \( s_i = \alpha \).

**Example 1** Assume an argument \( A \) for considering a route as being dangerous because there are known thieves in that area and the security there is poor. Then, we have that \( \text{supp}(A) = \{\text{th}, \text{ps}\} \) and \( \text{cl}(A) = \text{dr} \). Consider also an argument \( B \) saying that underpaid cops might provide poor security: then \( \text{supp}(B) = \{\text{upc}\} \) and \( \text{cl}(B) = \text{ps} \). These two arguments are depicted as triangles in Figure 1, each with its corresponding set of premises on its base, and the claim on top.

![Arguments for \( \text{dr} \) and \( \text{ps} \).](image)

From the definition of argument support, it is clear that a premise of an argument could be “instantiated” in many ways; that is, by evidence or another argument’s claim. The latter case gives rise to a larger, more complex structure comprising other arguments. This set of arguments will be called an argumental structure, as described in Definition 7.

The active/inactive status of an argument might involve other arguments: sometimes it is not evidence what will be as we can go when KR is made through abstract arguments.
directly activating arguments, but supporting arguments – which are arguments achieving a part of the support of others. That is, an argument could be activated by other arguments, rather than by evidence; they, in turn, are to be activated by evidence or by their own supporting arguments, and so on, until the last argument is based solely on evidence.

Definition 4 (Supporting Argument) An argument \( B \) is a supporting argument of an argument \( A \) iff \( cl(B) \in \text{supp}(A) \). Let \( cl(B) = s \), then we say that \( B \) supports \( A \) through \( s \).

The support of an argument \( A \) could lack some pieces of evidence, but other arguments could provide their claims as if they were evidence, so \( A \) should be considered active. However, there will be conditions for an argument to be considered coherent, thus preventing some arguments from becoming active. This will be clear next, with the (recursive) definition for an active argument, but before we introduce the notion of coherent argument.

Definition 5 (Coherent Argument) An argument \( A \) is coherent wrt. a set \( E \) of evidence iff \( A \) verifies the following properties:

- (Consistency wrt. \( E \)) An argument \( A \) is consistent wrt. \( E \) iff \( cl(A) \) does not contradict any evidence in \( E \).
- (Non-Redundancy wrt. \( E \)) An argument \( A \) is non-redundant wrt. \( E \) iff \( cl(A) \not\subseteq E \).

Reducant arguments wrt. evidence are not harmful, they just introduce new information that is not going to be useful –since evidence is beyond discussion and needs no reasons supporting it. In opposition, inconsistent arguments wrt. evidence may be harmful, since they could be used to activate other arguments, rendering invalid all that reasoning chain, thus requiring further restrictions in order to allow the construction of valid reasoning chains.

From now on, we will assume that any given argument is coherent wrt. the set of evidence corresponding to the context the argument is immersed into, unless stated otherwise.

Definition 6 (Active Argument) Given a set \( \text{Args} \) of arguments, a set \( E \) of evidence, a coherent argument \( A \in \text{Args} \) is active wrt. \( E \) iff for each \( s \in \text{supp}(A) \) either:

- \( s \in E \), or
- there is an active argument \( B \in \text{Args} \) that supports \( A \) through \( s \).

Example 2 Consider Example 1. If the set of evidence \( E_2 = \{ \text{th, upc} \} \), then \( A \) is active, because it can be activated by the evidence ‘\text{th}’ and the active (supporting) argument \( B \) for ‘ps’.

Example 3 From Example 2, if we consider a set of evidence \( E_{ps} = \{ \text{poor, security} \} \cup E_2 \), then argument \( B \) would be incoherent due to its redundancy wrt. \( E_{ps} \). In contrast, if we consider the set of evidence \( E_{nps} = \{ \neg \text{poor, security} \} \cup E_2 \), then argument \( B \) should also be incoherent, because it would be inconsistent wrt. \( E_{nps} \). In both cases \( B \) would not be active because is incoherent.

Regarding \( A \), from the set \( E_{ps} \), it becomes active directly from evidence, whereas from the set \( E_{nps} \), it ends up being inactive since its premises are left unsupported: although \( B \) achieves ‘ps’, it is not compliant with the consistency argument constraint.

From what we have defined, an argument could be inactive because: it might not have enough evidence and/or active arguments to support it, and/or it might not comply with at least one constraint. In both cases an inactive argument fails in being a support for reaching its associated claim.

Finally, regarding attacks between arguments, there is a normality condition to be taken into account: for a given set of arguments, it must contain every pair of arguments holding claims in contradiction.

Assumption 1 Let \( \text{Args} \) be a set of arguments and \( R \subseteq \text{Args} \times \text{Args} \), an attack relation. Given two arguments \( \{ A, B \} \subseteq \text{Args}, A = \{ \{ \}, c_1 \}, B = \{ \{ \}, c_2 \} \), if \( c_1 \) and \( c_2 \) are in contradiction, then \( A \not\in R B \) or \( B \not\in R A \).

Argumental Structures

The aggregation of arguments via the support relation needs further formalization, giving rise to the concept of argumental structure. Next, we will introduce this core element.

Definition 7 (Argumental Structure) Given a set \( \text{Args} \) of arguments, an argumental structure for a claim \( \alpha \) from a set of arguments \( \Sigma^* \subseteq \text{Args} \) is a tree of arguments \( \Sigma \) verifying:

1. The root argument \( A_{\text{root}} \in \Sigma^* \), called top argument, is such that \( \text{cl}(A_{\text{root}}) = \alpha \).
2. An inner node is an argument \( A_i \in \Sigma^* \) such that for each of its premises \( \beta \in \text{supp}(A_i) \) there is at most one child argument \( A_k \in \Sigma^* \) supporting \( A_i \) through \( \beta \).
3. A leaf is an argument \( A_k \in \Sigma^* \) supporting \( \alpha \).

Regarding notation for an argumental structure \( \Sigma \):

- The support of \( \Sigma \) is defined as:
  \( \text{supp}(\Sigma) = \text{suppset}(\{A_k\}), \) for every leaf \( A_k \in \Sigma \)
- The claim of \( \Sigma \) is noted as \( \text{cl}(\Sigma) = \alpha \).
- The set of arguments belonging to \( \Sigma \) is noted as \( \Sigma^* \).

Note that the \( \text{supp}() \) and \( \text{cl}() \) functions are overloaded: now they are applied to argumental structures. This is not going to be problematic, since either usage will be rather explicit. From now on, when clear enough, we will refer to argumental structures just as ‘structures’.

Example 4 From Example 2 we have the argumental structure \( \Sigma_4 \) such that \( \Sigma_4^* = \{ A, B \} \) (illustrated in Figure 2), where its support is \( \text{supp}(\Sigma_4) = \{ \text{th, upc} \} \) and its claim is \( \text{cl}(\Sigma_4) = \text{cl}(A) = \text{dr} \). Note that the support of \( \Sigma_4 \) is different from the set of all premises in it: \( \text{suppset}(\Sigma_4) = \{ \text{upc, ps, th} \} \); finally, its set of claims is \( \text{clset}(\Sigma_4) = \{ \text{ps, dr} \} \).

However, the definition for an argumental structure is not enough to represent knowledge in a sensible way. For instance, it allows for contradictory claims in a pair of arguments belonging to the same structure. Therefore, we have to define what is considered a well-formed argumental structure, but in order to do this we need the definition for transitive support.
Definition 8 (Transitive Support) An argument \( A_i \) transitivity supports an argument \( A_j \) iff there is a sequence of arguments \( \{B_1, \ldots, B_n\} \) where \( c1(A_i) \in \text{supp}(B_1) \), \( c1(B_n) \in \text{supp}(A_j) \) and \( c1(B_k) \in \text{supp}(B_{k+1}) \), with \( 1 \leq k \leq n - 1 \).

Definition 9 (Well-Formed Argumental Structure) An argumental structure \( \Sigma \) is well-formed iff \( \Sigma \) verifies the following properties:

- (Consistency) For each argument \( A_i \in \Sigma^* \) there is no argument \( A_k \in \Sigma^* (i \neq k) \) such that \( A_i, R, A_k \);
- (Non-Circularity) No argument \( A_i \in \Sigma^* \) transitivity supports an argument \( A_k \in \Sigma^* \) if \( c1(A_k) \in \text{supp}(A_i) \).
- (Uniformity) If a premise \( \beta \in \text{supp}(\Sigma) \) is supported by an argument \( B \in \Sigma^* \), then for every \( A_i \in \Sigma^* \) having \( \beta \) as a premise, \( B \) supports \( A_i \) through \( \beta \).

The property of consistency invalidates inherently contradictory argumental structures. The requirement of non-circularity avoids taking into consideration structures yielding a fallacious reasoning chain, where an argument ends up being transitively supported by itself. Finally, the restriction of uniformity refrains non-minimal structures to be deemed as well-formed, it does not allow heterogeneous support for a premise throughout a structure. These constraints are defined so we can trust a well-formed structure as a sensible reasoning chain, independently from the set of evidence. The consideration of a set of evidence is part of the notion of active argument, which is addressed in Definition 11.

Example 5 The following sets of arguments are argumental structures, but they are not well-formed ²:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \Sigma_4 )</th>
<th>( \Sigma_5 )</th>
<th>( \Sigma_6 )</th>
<th>( \Sigma_7 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( A_a )</td>
<td>( b )</td>
<td>( c )</td>
<td>( x )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( A_b )</td>
<td>( \neg a )</td>
<td>( A_c )</td>
<td>( b )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( A_c )</td>
<td>( a )</td>
<td>( \neg b )</td>
<td>( y )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- \( \Sigma_4 \) violates the consistency property, due to \( A_1 \) and \( A_3 \) having contradictory claims.

Example 6 The following sets of arguments do compose well-formed argumental structures:

- Structure \( \Sigma_8 \) presents no controversy, is a simple argumental structure.
- Structure \( \Sigma_9 \) shows a case similar to that of \( \Sigma_8 \). However, premise ‘b’ is always supported by the same argument \( A_1 \) therefore verifying the uniformity property.

From now on, we will assume that any given argumental structure is well-formed, unless stated otherwise.

Example 7 The following argumental structures show the notion of active argument:

- \( \Sigma_5 \) violates the non-circularity property, since \( A_1 = \{a\}, b \) transitively supports \( A_3 = \{c\}, a \).
- \( \Sigma_6 \) and \( \Sigma_7 \) violate the uniformity property:
  - in \( \Sigma_6 \), the premise ‘b’ has two occurrences, but is supported by \( A_1 \) in one case, and left unsupported in the other.
  - in \( \Sigma_7 \), the premise ‘b’ is supported by two different arguments.

Definition 10 Let \( \Sigma^* = \{A\} \) be the set of arguments of the argumental structure \( \Sigma \), then \( \Sigma \) is called a primitive argumental structure and \( \text{supp}(\Sigma) = \text{supp}(A), \ c1(\Sigma) = c1(A) \).

The concept of primitive argumental structures shows that an argument can be seen as a particular case of an argumental structure.

Now that we have defined what a well-formed argumental structure is, we can introduce the notion of active argumental structures. This will allow us to recognize those structures that are capable of achieving their claims when considering the current situation.

Definition 11 (Active Argumental Structure) Given a set \( E \) of evidence, a well-formed argumental structure \( \Sigma \) is active wrt. \( E \) iff \( \text{supp}(\Sigma) \subseteq E \) and every \( A \in \Sigma^* \) is a coherent argument wrt. \( E \).

This definition states an important property: the premises of an active argumental structure is composed just by evidence. This puts this concept nearer to the notion of active argument, showing that argumental structures can be seen as arguments in the usual way if their inner composition is abstracted away. The definition also requires every argument to be coherent wrt. the set of evidence, therefore some well-formed structures having their support satisfied by evidence will not be active due to some argument being redundant and/or inconsistent wrt. the evidence. Note that coherence
By construction of an active structure, let assume that there is an argument \( E \) that is not the top argument of any argumental structure, because \( A_1 \) is redundant wrt. \( E \).

There is a subtle relation between active arguments and active argumental structures that will be made explicit by the following propositions.

**Proposition 1** If \( \Sigma \) is an active argumental structure wrt. a set \( E \) of evidence, then every sub-argument of \( \Sigma \) is an active argument wrt. \( E \).

**Proof:** By construction of an active structure \( \Sigma \) wrt. \( E \), let \( A_{\text{top}} \) be its active (thus coherent) top argument. Therefore, either \( \text{supp}(A_{\text{top}}) \subseteq E \), or some premise \( \beta \in \text{supp}(A_{\text{top}}) \) is supported by an active argument \( A_i \). In the latter case, \( A_i \) is included into \( \Sigma \), and then the same analysis is made regarding the premises of \( A_i \). The construction of the tree of arguments is performed recursively, and in each step an active argument is included into \( \Sigma \). Therefore, \( \Sigma \) contains only active arguments wrt. \( E \). □

The reverse of the latter proposition is not true, as shown in the following example.

**Example 8** Consider a set of evidence \( E_8 = \{a, b\} \), and two structures \( \Sigma_1 \) and \( \Sigma_2 \) such that \( \Sigma_1 = \{A_1, A_2\} \) and \( \Sigma_2 = \{A_1\} \), where \( A_1 = \langle(c), d\rangle \), \( A_2 = \langle(a, b), c\rangle \), as depicted below.

From \( E_8 \), structure \( \Sigma_1 \) is active, but \( \Sigma_2 \) is not. Clearly, both argumental structures contain active arguments, but this condition does not ensure them to be active.

Example 8 shows that, in a way, argumental structures have to be ‘complete’ in order for them to be active. That is, they must include all of the necessary arguments for their top argument to be active. Only then the support of these structures will be composed by evidence. This statement is made clear by the results of the following two propositions.

**Proposition 2** Every active argument wrt. a set \( E \) of evidence is the top argument of at least one active argumental structure wrt. \( E \).

**Proof:** Let assume that there is an argument \( A \) active wrt. \( E \) that is not the top argument of any argumental structure active wrt. \( E \). Since \( A \) is active, either (1) its premises are a subset of \( E \), or (2) some premise \( \beta \) is supported by an active argument \( B \). Case (1) clashes with the assumption of \( A \) not being the top argument of any active structure, since the primitive structure composed just by \( A \) would be active wrt. \( E \).

E. Case (2) indicates that a structure could be built containing at least \( A \) and \( B \), and then the analysis made over \( A \) is also applicable to \( B \), because it should also be active wrt. \( E \), in order for \( A \) to be active. Hence, the recursive consideration of new arguments while including them into a new hypothetical structure ends when all the premises of the last argument is a subset of \( E \). This would mean that the hypothetical structure is active wrt. \( E \), leading to absurdity. This is due to the assumption of \( A \) not being the top argument of any argumental structure active wrt. \( E \). □

Note that Proposition 2 allows for an active argument to be top argument of more than one active argumental structure, which is correct, as depicted in the following example.

**Example 9** Consider \( \Sigma_1 \) from Example 8, an argument \( A_3 = \langle\{x\}, c\rangle \), and a set of evidence \( E_9 = \{a, b, x\} \). Then, the following active argumental structures can be built:

\[
\begin{align*}
\Sigma_1 & \quad \Sigma_3 \\
\text{d} & \quad \text{d} \\
\text{A}_3 & \quad \text{c} \\
\text{A}_1 & \quad \text{c} \\
a \quad b \\
x
\end{align*}
\]

Note that both are well-formed active argumental structures wrt. \( E_9 \) and have the same top argument.

**Proposition 3** Given an active argumental structure \( \Sigma \) wrt. a set \( E \) of evidence, there is no proper substructure \( \Sigma_i \) of \( \Sigma \) such that \( \Sigma_i \) is active wrt. \( E \).

**Proof:** Let assume that \( \Sigma_i \) is an active structure wrt. \( E \). Then \( \text{supp}(\Sigma_i) \subseteq E \). Now assume that \( \Sigma \) is also active wrt. \( E \). Therefore, there is at least one premise of \( \Sigma_i \) that, in \( \Sigma \), is supported by an argument \( B \). Consequently, one of the following holds: (1) \( B \) is redundant wrt. \( E \) and \( \Sigma \) is not an active structure wrt. \( E \); (2) \( \Sigma_i \) has a premise that is not evidence. Either of these cases leads to absurdity. This is due to the assumption of \( \Sigma_i \) being an active proper substructure of \( \Sigma \). □

**The Dynamic Argumentation Framework**

Now that we have defined the main components of our theory, we will put them together in the definition of the dynamic argumentation framework. In the literature, argumentation frameworks are usually static, in the sense that every argument in them participates in the argumentative interplay, without regard to the actual validity of the arguments in the current situation. This is so because they do not consider such a thing as a possibly changing situation, but instead are restricted to a single snapshot.

Almost every new approach to abstract argumentation is built on top of Dung’s argumentation framework (Dung 1995) (from now on, simply ‘AF’). This framework is defined as a pair with a set of arguments and a defeat relation ranging over pairs of them. The objective of our approach is to extend this theory to handle dynamics. To cope with
this we consider a set of available evidence, which determines what arguments can be used to make inferences. If we follow Dung’s approach, the consideration of a changing set of arguments would involve passing from a framework to another, but this cannot be performed lightly: what is the relation between these frameworks? Where do the new arguments come from and where do the old ones go? Furthermore, if we are incorporating a set of evidence that activates arguments: how does the set of evidence change? How does the set of evidence affect the status of arguments? These questions have to be properly addressed in order to build a coherent dynamic framework. Therefore, next we define the notion of attack between structures, and then, we introduce the dynamic argumentation framework.

The notion of argumental substructure allows us to redefine attacks, now in terms of structures. Before this definition, we introduce the notion of argumental substructure.

**Definition 12 (Argumental Substructure)** Given an argumental structure Σ from a set of arguments Args, the set Σ₁ is an argumental substructure of Σ iff Σ₁ ⊆ Σ and Σ₁ is an argumental structure from Args. If Σ₁ ⊆ Σ then Σ₁ is a proper argumental substructure of Σ.

Note that an argumental structure is an argumental substructure of itself. As with the former, we will refer to the latter just as a ‘substructure’, when convenient.

**Definition 13 (Attack Between Argumental Structures)** Given a set Args of arguments, an attack relation R ⊆ Args × Args between arguments, and two argumental structures Σ₁ and Σ₂ from Args, the structure Σ₁ attacks Σ₂ iff there is a substructure Σ₃ of Σ₂ such that top(Σ₁) ⊆ top(Σ₃).

The attack relation between arguments is composed of pairs of arguments; that is, given two arguments A and B, if A ∈ R B ((A, B) ∈ R), then we have that A attacks (or defeats) B. Equivalently, we will say that A is a defeater for B. When speaking of argumental structures, we use the same vocabulary.

**Remark 1** Given an argument A from an active argumental structure Σ, if A is defeated by an active argument B, then Σ is defeated by an argumental structure whose top argument is B.

The statement made by this remark was referred as conflict inheritance in (Martínez, García, and Simari 2007).

**Definition 14 (Dynamic Argumentation Framework (DAF))** A DAF is a pair (E, (U, R)), composed by a set E of evidence, and a framework (U, R), where U is the universal set of arguments and R ⊆ U × U is the attack relation between arguments.

Different instances of the set of evidence determine different instances of the DAF. Thus, when “restricting” a framework (U, R) to its associated set of evidence, we can obtain a (static) framework in the classical sense, i.e., a pair in which every argument is active, and the attack relation contains pairs of them. This “restriction” will be called a static instance, and is addressed below.

**Example 10** Consider the argumental structure of Example 4, in which knowing that there are thieves in a place and that cops there are underpaid leads us to think that that route is going to be dangerous. Let us assume that there are many cops (noted as ‘mc’) in the location, therefore we have a reason to think that security there is good (‘gs’). Another argument leading us to think of good security is that the cops are foreigners (‘fc’), then they are probably not acquainted with the place (un), and that could give the idea of poor security there (‘ps’). Then, we can build the following argumental structures:

Thus, we have a DAF (E₁₀, (U₁₀, R₁₀)), where the universal set of arguments is U₁₀ = {A₁, A₂, A₃, B₁, B₂, B₃}, and we will consider a set of evidence E₁₀ = {many cops, underpaid cops, thieves}, along with an empty attack relation R₁₀ = ∅. Then, from set U₁₀ of arguments A₁, A₂ and A₃ are active wrt. R₁₀, thus reaching their claims good security, poor security and dangerous route. The latter claim is achieved via the argumental structure Σ₁₃, whose top argument is A₃. The remaining arguments B₁, B₂ and B₃ are inactive, as well as structures Σ₁ and Σ₃₂, since they have unfulfilled supports wrt. E₁₀ and thus cannot reach their claims.

A subset of the universal set will be considered as the set of active arguments wrt. the set of evidence. This set will contain those arguments that are to be taken into account to perform reasoning in concordance with the current situation.

**Definition 15 (Set of Active Arguments)** Given a DAF F = (E, (U, R)), the set of active arguments in F is A = {A ∈ U | A is active wrt. E}.

Given the universal set U of arguments and the set A of active arguments we can derive the set of inactive arguments as U \ A. This latter set would be very useful when reasoning about possible worlds, potential situations, or even goals and the plausibility of reaching them. Moreover, since the attack relation is given over the universal set, there will be active and inactive attacks. The latter relation (involving at least one inactive argument) would allow us to, say, activate defeaters for currently active arguments. These concepts can be translated into terms of argumental structures.

**Definition 16 (Set of Active Argumental Structures)** Given a DAT T and the set A of active arguments in T, the set of active argumental structures in T is the maximal set S of argumental structures from A.
Proposition 4: Given a set $\mathcal{A}$ of active arguments and a set $\mathcal{S}$ of active argumental structures from $\mathcal{A}$, then $\bigcup_{\mathcal{A}^* \in \mathcal{S}} (\mathcal{A}^*) = \mathcal{A}$. Proof: Trivial from Definition 16.

As in the case of arguments, the set of active structures allows us to distinguish the set $\mathcal{S}^0$ of inactive argumental structures, as a set of arguments composing an argumental structure, but containing at least one argument that is not active.

Example 11: From Example 10, the set of active argumental structures is: $\mathcal{S}_{11} = \{\Sigma_{13}, \Sigma_2\}$. An inactive argumental structure would be $\Sigma_{32}$.

Definition 17 (Inactive/Active Attacks): Given a DAF $(\mathcal{E}, (U, R))$ and the set of all active (inactive) argumental structures $\mathcal{S}$ ($\mathcal{S}^0$) from $U$, we have:

- **The active attack relation:** $R = \{(\Sigma_1, \Sigma_2) | \{\Sigma_1, \Sigma_2\} \subseteq \mathcal{S}, \Sigma_1 \text{ attacks } \Sigma_2\}$
- **The inactive attack relation:** $R^0 = \{(\Sigma_1, \Sigma_2) | \Sigma_1 \in \mathcal{S}^0 \text{ or } \Sigma_2 \in \mathcal{S}^0, \Sigma_1 \text{ attacks } \Sigma_2\}$

Static Instance of a DAF

Next, we define the static instance of a given DAF, which we will show that is equivalent to an AF.

Definition 18 (Static Instance): Given a DAF $(\mathcal{E}, (U, R))$, the static instance of $(\mathcal{E}, (U, R))$ is the AF $(\mathcal{S}, R)$, where $\mathcal{S}$ is the set of all active argumental structures from $U$ wrt. $\mathcal{E}$, and $R$ is the active attack relation between structures in $\mathcal{S}$. The notation is $(U, R)|_{\mathcal{E}} = (\mathcal{S}, R)$.

Every DAF, at any moment, has an associated static instance, which is an AF. Therefore, all the work done on acceptability of arguments and argumentation frameworks semantics can be applied to the DAF here defined, just by finding its static instance. Moreover, since we added some structure to the notion of argument, we can go a step further and consider justification of claims, either in a skeptical or a cautious way.

DAFs can be seen as a template for generating multiple AFs representing the same knowledge applied to different situations. The number of static instances that can be obtained from a single DAF is quite large. Provided that each argument has at least one premise (i.e., a possible evidence), then the amount of possible evidence equals or exceeds the amount of arguments in the universal set. Let $E$ be this set of possible evidence, then if we consider a universal set $U$ of arguments we have: $|E| \geq |U|$. Considering that each possible subset of evidence composes a different static instance of the DAF, we have that the amount of static instances is in the order of $2^{|E|}$. Finally, it is now clear that there is a large number of AFs associated to a single DAF.

Updating Evidence in a DAF

Since the set of evidence is dynamic, it defines the particular instance of the DAF that corresponds with the current situation. In order to cope with this, the basic operation performed over a DAF is the **evidence update**. This mechanism should ensure the DAF reflects the new (consistent) state of the world. To ease the legibility of the next definition, we use the complement notation to indicate contradiction between pieces of evidence.

Definition 19 (Evidence Update (resp., Erasure)): Given a DAF $(\mathcal{E}, (U, R))$, and $E_1$, a set of evidence such that for every $\beta \in E_1$, $\beta \notin E$ (resp., $\beta \in E$), a multiple evidence update (resp., erasure) operation is such that $(\mathcal{E} \cup E_1, (U, R))$ (resp., $(\mathcal{E} \setminus E_1, (U, R))$).

The evidence update/erasure changes the instance of the DAF: it makes the set of active arguments vary. In that sense, it could be seen as a form of revision: the specification of what holds in the world is represented by active arguments and attacks. However, the impact of the evidence update in these sets neither performs nor is intended as a formal revision of the theory whatsoever.

With updates and erasures we do not change the representation (or specification) of the knowledge about the world, but what is perceived. Our update and erasure operations to change the set of evidence are so far treated shallowly, since it suffices to prove the usefulness of the theory presented in this article. However, ongoing work is devoted to reinforce this aspect, inspired by the original definitions given in (Katuno and Mendelzon 1991).

Example 12: Consider Example 10 and a DAF $(\mathcal{E}_{10}, (U_{10}, R_{12}))$, where $R_{12} = \{(A_2, A_1), (B_1, A_1), (B_2, B_1)\}$, as depicted in Figure 3. Note that arrows represent the attack relation, and gray dashed triangles are inactive arguments.

![Figure 3: DAF from Example 12.](image)

Then we have:

- $\mathcal{S}_{12} = \{\Sigma_2, \Sigma_{13}\}$ are active argumental structures;
- $\mathcal{S}_{12}^0 = \{\Sigma_1, \Sigma_{32}\}$ are inactive argumental structures;
- $R_{12} = \{\{\Sigma_2, \Sigma_{13}\}\}$ are active attacks;
- $R_{12}^0 = \{\{\Sigma_1, \Sigma_{13}\}, \{\Sigma_{32}, \Sigma_1\}\}$ are inactive attacks.

The static instance $(U_{10}, R_{12})|_{\mathcal{E}_{10}}$ is the AF $(\mathcal{S}_{12}, R_{12})$, which is illustrated in Figure 4(a).

If we update the set of evidence by adding knowledge about the cops saying that they are volunteer, we have that $\Sigma_1$ becomes active, as well as its attack against $\Sigma_{13}$, leaving $\Sigma_{32}$ as the only inactive structure, and $(\Sigma_{32}, \Sigma_1)$ is the only inactive attack. The static instance of the updated DAF is depicted in Figure 4(b).

3Primitive argumental structures composed of $A_1, A_3, B_2$, and $B_3$ were not represented separately for the sake of simplicity.
Now consider we find out that the cops are foreigners, and that there is not as many as we were told before. Therefore, we make an update of the piece of evidence ‘fc’ and an erasure of ‘mc’. This activates $\Sigma_{22}$ and the attack $(\Sigma_{32}, \Sigma_1)$, and inactivates $\Sigma_2$ along with its attack against $\Sigma_{13}$. This static instance is shown in Figure 4(c).

![Figure 4: Static instances from Example 12.](image)

Each static instance yields a particular set of accepted arguments. If we pick the grounded semantics (Dung 1995): the static instance (a) accepts just the structure $\Sigma_2$; the static instance (b) accepts $\Sigma_2$ and $\Sigma_1$; the static instance (c) accepts $\Sigma_{32}$ and $\Sigma_{13}$. Therefore, with this semantics, the last one is the only scenario in which we would believe the path we are analyzing to pass through is dangerous.

In order to complete the relation between our work and Dung’s there is also a way to obtain the associated DAF from a static framework. We only require the static framework to include arguments with an explicit set of premises and a claim, so they can be organized in primitive argumental structures (those containing just one argument). Then, the union of the sets of support of each argumental structure in the system is the set of evidence, and thus we have a DAF. However, this part of the relation is somehow weak: obtaining premises and claim out of an abstract argument may be difficult to do in a standard way. Therefore, the obtention of a DAF from a static framework is not currently in our focus. We are more interested in the reverse relation, so that you can specify a DAF and capture each of its static instances in the well-known AF format, and then make the analysis of acceptability of arguments in the usual way. The static instance of a DAF contains only active argumental structures (i.e., all of them are used to make inferences) and an active attack relation connecting them, so the association between a DAF’s static instance and an AF is quite direct. This is captured by Lemma 1.

**Lemma 1** The static instance of a DAF is equivalent to Dung’s definition for an abstract argumentation framework.

**Proof:** Trivial from Definition 18.

**On the Applications of the DAF**

This section describes some ongoing research lines that would take advantage of the DAF. Having a dynamic set of evidence that has a direct correlation with the set of active arguments allows reasoning about possible situations.

**Argument Theory Change**

Let us consider an argumentation-based agent with a certain goal $G$ expressed in the form of a set of accepted arguments. Thus, we wish to know how should we change the set of evidence in order to reach $G$. In a recent paper (Rotstein et al. 2008), we presented a preliminary version of the DAF (that can be easily evolved to the current form) along with the basics of argument theory change. In that article, a warrant-prioritized revision operator is introduced: it introduces a new argument to a DAF seeking to be accepted; it does so by removing those arguments that interfere with this warrant, on behalf of a minimal change criterion. Hence, we would be able to tell which pieces of evidence are to be dropped for an argument to be accepted. Moreover, this approach could be extended by going in the opposite direction: bringing up the necessary evidence to activate those arguments that (because of the attacks they activate) would ensure the new argument to be accepted. In this way, we could go further and tell which pieces of evidence are to be added and which are to be dropped in order for a whole set of arguments to be accepted, whenever possible.

**Argumentation-based Agent Architecture**

An agent architecture is defined over a number of components, as the BDI model is composed by the three components handling beliefs, desires and intentions. If the components of an architecture are represented through a DAF, the agent is thus capable of not only updating its perception of the world (i.e., the set of evidence), but also change its preferences and knowledge accordingly by adding/dropping the necessary pieces of evidence to activate/deactivate the corresponding arguments. An agent immersed in a dynamic environment should be prepared to incorporate changes in the world’s rules (i.e., the way things are interpreted); for instance, an agent dedicated to schedule processes in an agent-oriented operative system must be able to change the schedule policy. If the set of evidence is kept up-to-date, the agent will make inferences based on the current state of the world, but it could also hypothesize about possible states representing variations of the current one, thus being able to move towards its goal. Finally, the dynamic modification of a particular subset of evidence could allow the agent to learn from its own experience in order to adapt.

**Analysis of Legal Cases**

Another application that could benefit from the usage of the dynamic argumentation framework is the analysis of legal cases. Assume that a verdict has been reached regarding a certain case and that the accused was found guilty. We have a number of allegations (i.e., arguments) that were posed against the presumption of innocence, and arguments against them, and so on, yielding a graph of arguments interrelated by the attack relation. The argument graph is a visualization of the framework that justifies the verdict. Note that the semantics chosen should be sensible as to classify the presumption of innocence as a rejected argument. We also have the set of evidence from which arguments were based. All the arguments posed should be active, since they were accepted at the trial. Now an appropriate mechanism could be used in order to vary the set of evidence and discover under which circumstances the convict could have
been found innocent (for instance, we could use the warrant-prioritized revision operator mentioned above, in ‘Argument Theory Change’). Moreover, we could even add to the framework those arguments that did not have enough support from available evidence (which are inactive), and play with the possibility of actually having that evidence. The dynamic framework plus an appropriate mechanism could be a useful tool to hypothesize about possible scenarios and outcomes of an actual legal case.

Conclusions and Future Work

In this article we have presented a new approach to abstract argumentation frameworks. Our model, as many others, is based on Dung’s framework (AF) and represents an extension that is the basis of several research lines, some of which were introduced in the previous section. The main subject of this paper is the definition of the Dynamic Argumentation Framework, from which a static instance can be obtained. This instance was shown to be equivalent to the AF. However, throughout several examples, it was shown that the DAF allows for a more general representation of knowledge than the mentioned framework: it considers a varying set of evidence that changes the base to make inferences (i.e., the underlying static instance); therefore, multiple AFs can be obtained from different instances of a given DAF.

Regarding future work, besides what was already discussed in the previous section, we are also interested in exploring the capability of reasoning about possible situations, and establishing a relation with the area of modal logics. This work is currently underway. Although this research line is mainly theoretical, one of its main goals is to make an implementation out of each application for the DAF. This is likely to be done in Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP) (García and Simari 2004) or an extension of it. For instance, the formalism defined in (Rotstein et al. 2008) found its DeLP reification in (Moguillansky et al. )

Finally, we will explore two extensions of the DAF: (1) a more natural way to specify and build the attack relation between arguments from constraints and preferences; (2) change operators to modify the universal set of arguments and the attack relation. The first extension will involve a slight change in the definition of the framework: it will build the attack relation from the specification of a set of constraints among claims (each constraint is an n-tuple of claims), stating which claims cannot hold together. As expected, some constraints are implicit, such as pairs of complementary claims. Once conflicts among arguments are obtained, a preference function will decide, for each pair, which argument prevails. The second extension acts as a meta-level debugging tool, allowing the dynamic modification of the sets of arguments and attacks. Note that the modification of the universal set of arguments turns it into a working set instead. Special care has to be taken regarding the addition of attacks, since this may introduce new arguments. The same applies to the deletion of arguments, since some attacks will no longer be valid.

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